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Abstract
The paper relates virtual dialogues about social simulation, with the implicit reference to
Galieo's 'dialogues concerning two new sciences'.
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The three characters, Dreamer, Experimentalist and Realistic, meet in an ideal place of Toscana. They
come from different places of the old, decadent and altogether fundamentally renewing Europe of the
early 21st century. They were invited in this place to discuss matters of high importance: Do agent
based computer simulations offer a venue for a new social science? On what basis such a new science
would stand? What role would play experimental approaches developed in social psychology? How to
use case studies from the real world? Is there a need to develop a specific methodology of simulation?
A tiny breeze of spring brings perfumes from the high cypress along the pools and gardens. Dreamer
opens the discussion.
Three different views on social simulations
1.1
Dreamer: In this very place, almost exactly 400 years ago, our far ancestors Simplicio, Salviati
and Sagredo discussed the foundations of a new science[1]. Their dialogues can be seen as the
birth of modern physics, which completely modified our perception and relation with Nature. We
are here to examine if the same type of foundation is possible concerning another part of our
surrounding reality: social phenomena. Are we about to discover the "language in which the
great book of social reality is written"? I believe so. Other distinguished colleagues already
announced this fundamental change in a more or less straightforward way (Gilbert and Conte
1995, Nowak and Vallacher 1998). I would like to be more precise. I believe that the
fundamental feature that the language of social phenomena must be able to express is the
"strange loop" between individual interactions and collective dynamics. Agent based simulations
allow us to express such a strange loop. The Galileo Galilei of social phenomena might very well
be among the young PhD students attending the last ESSA conference in Koblenz!
1.2
Realistic: Dear Dreamer, how can you be so naïve? How many great thinkers claimed to have
found this famous language of social phenomena? Take the Scottish philosophers Locke, Hume,
Smith for instance. Each of them believed to have found the equivalent in social dynamics of the
universal gravity principle. Illusions! 250 years later, all these magnificent theories interest only
a dozen of decadent European specialists. K. Marx and his followers acted the same play of
scientifically discovering the very mechanisms of social dynamics. What is left from these
dramatic theoretical deliria? Ruins and death. The more recent research in social sciences,
although its claims are generally more modest, is no less in a wrong direction in my view. Its
theoretical principia are totally baroque: have you ever seen a utility function in reality? or a
global equilibrium? Its experimental approaches, ridiculously mimicking physics, studies
artificial, ideal situations which have nothing to do with social reality, and will never tell us
anything about it! Nevertheless, I agree with you that agent based simulations could bring
something new. But the reason is that they can be "reality driven", and ignore all these
theoretical fantasies. A new science, yes, but a "tabula rasa", sticking to real case studies!
1.3
Experimentalist: Dear Realistic, you criticise theoretical concepts, but your proposal is also full
of illusions. How did modern sciences develop? Through observations on well defined, well
controlled experiments. It is impossible to drive any robust conclusion from a case study in the
real world. Even if you take several case studies, which is better, you will never be able to
ensure that your interpretation of the phenomenon is the right one. As Kant pointed out, the
revolution of modern science consists of submitting Nature to questions as a Judge in a court,
instead of letting it tell us what it wants. Dear Dreamer, I can address the same reproach to you.
Computer simulations give us examples of complex links between individual interactions and
collective dynamics. So what? The game of life is a perfect example of such dynamics. Does it
tell us anything about social phenomena? Not at all. Nevertheless, I agree with both of you that
something new might come out from social simulations. But only if we incorporate into them
well established experimental facts, both about individual interactions and about global
dynamics!
 What epistemological basis ?
3.1
Dreamer: Well, I think that we at least agree on the potentiality of a new science opened by the
use of agent based simulations. However, strong divergences appear among us about how this
science should develop. Let us try to better identify the nature of our apparent disagreements,
by considering in more details the epistemological basis we would favour for this science.
Experimentalist, my dear friend, you are bringing us back to a very old debate in epistemology.
It is well established that modern science is not only based on the experimental approach
(although I agree that this plays a fundamental role), but on simple ideal abstractions, which can
be expressed in mathematics and drive the experimentations. For instance, A. Koyré, in his
study on the birth of modern physics, strongly stresses the fundamental role of the inertia
principle: an object, in a void space, has a linear movement of constant velocity. This principle
is totally abstract, and cannot be observed experimentally. Yet, it gives its meaning to the whole
construction. We need an equivalent to this principle (or to the universal gravity) in social
studies, and social simulations can help us to test candidate principles in full extent. Dear
Realistic, Hume, Smith and Marx did not have this means to test their ideas! This is why we can
do better now.
3.2
Realistic: Physics is based on abstract principles, I agree on that, my dear Dreamer, but not
with the conclusions you make. Cartwright (1983) has argued (with examples) that relationships
that hold in experimental conditions do not hold in real world applications. This is because
these experiments are generally driven by simplistic principles. In social dynamics the situation
is even more complex. In the real world various social processes may affect one another at
different times. For example, attitudes may shift due to information provided by other people,
norms may change and as a result people may start interacting with other people that in turn
further affect their attitudes. Due to the inherently complex nature of many dynamical
processes, the same behavioural mechanism may result in very different behavioural outcomes
in different conditions. Hence the dynamics resulting from the interactions among large
numbers of people are not accessible for laboratory research. You are both sticking to old
fashioned rusty scientific principles. Alas! Where ever one looks in the works of our
contemporaries, one sees a compulsion to gain respectability by developing formal statements
and using formal statistical methods. And, yet, what does formalisation give us? It gives us
precision but not accuracy. In computer science, verification by formal proof does not
necessarily (or even usually) imply validation - that a program will actually do what it was
intended to do. In social science and social simulation, formalisation yields precision of
expression but not accuracy of description. Accuracy requires using a language that does not
require us to distort what we observe. To use numbers to represent qualitative social
phenomena is just such a distortion. Both formalisms and experimental results should as far as
possible retain the language used by those whose behaviour we seek to describe and to
understand.
2.3
Experimentalist: Let me illustrate the crucial role of experimentations on an example. Consider
the "shift to the extreme" phenomenon. This phenomenon was observed by G. Le Bon in the
19th century on real phenomena: when there are group discussions in which people must agree
on a common position, extreme positions tend to be adopted by the group. Le Bon cites the
example of the 4th of August 1789 night in the French revolution, in which extreme decisions
were made. The problem is that you can find many counter examples of careful, balanced group
decisions! This is only with Moscovici and Doise (1992) and other experimentalists that we
managed to better understand this social phenomenon. They showed that there are conditions
of communication favouring a shift to the extreme, and others, which on the contrary inhibit it.
These facts could only be obtained by strictly controlling the conditions of experiments, and by
replicating them many times, at different places. You see, dear Realistic, such experiments tell
us much more about real group decision-making processes, than observation of case studies.
Moreover, Agent Based simulations offer the possibility to test different social theories
explaining these facts, as attempted in (Deffuant et al 2004). To improve the representation of
behavioural dynamics in social simulation, I emphasise the importance of developing agent
rules using existing major behaviour theories, which are based on well established empirical
facts.
A common theoretical core for agents ?
3.1
Dreamer: Well, I think that our divergences about the epistemological grounding of the
developing science are now very clear. Let us see if a deeper discussion about more concrete
modelling methods would help to reconcile our views. The major question that pops up from
the last point of our friend Experimentalist is: what level of theoretical detail is required in
agent architectures? Obviously it is too complex to include all details of the abundance of social
scientific theories in a single agent architecture. This would yield (if possible at all) an extremely
complex architecture lacking transparency. I believe that we must on the contrary imagine new
simple theoretical principles from which we could derive important experimental results, and
possibly reinterpret them. Social simulations must take the results of social psychology into
account, but to point out their common root to include in the agent dynamics ! There are
already some attempts to design such architectures (for instance the BDI architecture). We must
continue in this direction !
3.2
Realistic: Poor Dreamer! Your case is even worse than the one of my friend Experimentalist!
Computer scientists also engage in faux formalism. They use logical structures such as BDI
logics to design and sometimes to program their agent based software without ever proving the
theorems implied by the formulations. They claim the virtues of formalism without the
discipline of formalism. And how successful have they been? I quote Raphael Bordini et al.
(2005):
After almost a decade during which research on agent-oriented programming
struggled to deliver any concrete results, the last couple of years has seen an
impressive improvement in the quality of research in the area, as well as a
considerable increase in the number or researchers involved in it. This lead to the
creation of two international workshop series on the subject.
The citations given by Bordini et al. for nearly useful agent oriented programming have such
titles as "Proving the asymmetry thesis principles for a BDI agent-oriented programming
language" and "Efficient intention selection in BDI agents via decision-theoretic task
scheduling". As a result, I think the quotation given above means that, having laboured mightily
for ten years, the concrete results of formal BDI agent-oriented programming is a couple of
international workshop series. There has certainly been useful programming using BDI-like
constructs in agent oriented languages, but these have had nothing to do with BDI logics as
formalisms for proving anything. The BDI programming paradigm may be useful. Claims to use
BDI logic are a prime example of faux formalism. If the theories have not themselves been
validated and their conditions of application identified, then I argue that there is no justification
to constrain models or, more generally, social analysis by such theories. Case studies, per
contra, can provide detailed accounts of dynamic social processes over quite extended intervals
of time. Social simulation models designed and validated with the participation of stakeholders
and other domain experts are then validated by comparing model numerical output with social
statistics and also by allowing the stakeholders to assess the plausibility of the behaviour and
interactions among the agents as models of the stakeholders themselves. Validation against
case studies can also take the form of having independent experts or observers assess the
qualitative behaviour of agents. By their nature, of course, agent based social simulation models
of case studies support validation against history.
3.3
Experimentalist: Like Realistic, I am very reluctant to consider a priori simple rules or theories,
and I disagree with your idea of finding the simplest explanations for social phenomena, dear
Dreamer. The risk of using such 'simple rules' is that the actual (experimentally tested and
empirically observed) behavioural dynamics generating the macro-level effects are
misrepresented. For example, Reynolds (1987) developed an approach to simulate flocks as a
distributed behavioural model, and many people who view these animated flocks immediately
recognize them as a representation of a natural flock, and find them similarly delightful to
watch. However, research on schooling of fish illustrate that we lack a good understanding of
the micro-behaviour of fish in relation to schooling. Indeed, information about the behaviour of
nearby neighbours is found to be a crucial factor in empirical studies, but which behavioural
rules are in use is a puzzle and so far computational models fail to reproduce observed
behaviour in detail (e.g., Camazine et al. 2001, see also Jager & Janssen 2003). Most human
behaviour (simple) agent architectures being used, such as the one Dreamer mentioned, have a
limited foundation in micro-level behavioural theories. As a consequence, they suffer from a
lack of experimental grounding. This causes that strategies aimed at changing system
behaviour as derived from the simulation model may not target the actual behavioural
dynamics, and hence provide less realistic and applicable results. Yet I propose that the main
constituents of social scientific theory should be integrated in agent architectures, e.g. human
needs as drivers of behaviour, social and individual decision strategies involving different
degrees of information processing, and cognition to represent agents knowledge base and
learning capabilities. One example of such an integrated approach is the consumat approach
(Jager, Janssen & Vlek 1999, see also Jager 2000).
3.4
Dreamer: Well, maybe our opinions, although different, are compatible, finally. My point is that
we need a theoretical basis behind the micro-behaviour plethora of experimentally grounded
theories. But I think that, this theoretical principle should be selected by strong tests against
existing experimental evidences (and hopefully new experiments), to check its validity. It should
also be tested against case studies and observations in the real world. Both of you will need to
make modelling choices, you Experimentalist, to organise the integrated architecture, and you
Realistic, to build your model representing the historical evolution in your case studies. Maybe
our divergence is on the extent of this modelling principle: I dream of a general modelling
principle that could have a very wide application, both explaining and enlightening current
experimental results as well as case study observations. You believe that the discovery of such a
grand principle is very unlikely. I agree that we certainly should not wait for it to go on working.
We must go on testing concrete modelling methods against experimental and case studies
evidence, because this is in my view how we will progressively design the fundamental
principles we need. The point we have in common now is how to test and validate the models or
modelling principles. I propose to engage the discussion more specifically on this point.
 Dealing with complexity
4.1
Realistic: Let me illustrate my view of social simulation practice on the example of the recent
referenda in France and the Netherlands. Social simulations could provide major improvements
in our understanding of these social events. Field researchers should collect data on people's
attitudes and opinions, how various sources (friends, colleagues, religious organisations - in
general, social networks as well as media) affected these attitudes, and how the global voting
intentions vary over time. Social simulation researchers should formalize agents from these
data and come back to panels of people to check that they agree with the individual models.
Our friend Experimentalist's laboratory methods could and should also be used. In this way, we
validate our models at micro level using the same qualitative terminology as our informants use.
Of course, the simulations should also be validated against the global data on the voting
intentions and the final vote by identifying and simulating social processes that are consistent
with the actual outcome. The comparison to the real data should not take into account the
particular values, which are beyond the precision of the models, but rather consider some
general patterns and shapes, to define "stylised facts". The purpose of such a model would not
be to predict if people in France and the Netherlands would reject the European constitution, but
rather to understand the process in which they came (perhaps) to fear immigration and/ or to
dislike the president Chirac or prime-minister Balkenende and to articulate the fear and the
dislike by voting "non/nej/no".
4.2
Experimentalist: Dear Realistic, you are forgetting one of the main questions we are confronted
with in social simulation: "Can we validate against cases if we know that in complex systems the
outcomes could have been radically different". The point I want to address here is that
calibrating a model to real case data is the most dangerous thing to do when modelling a
complex system. Rather, we have to find the proper level for validation. In complex systems the
same underlying (behavioural) processes may give rise to different development. For this
reason, I agree that validation should focus on the processes in the system but not, I would
argue, on the global outcomes of these processes. And again, I argue that these individual
processes must be grounded on well validated observations in social psychology. Dear Realistic,
simply asking some participants about how they proceed as you suggested, is very delicate.
There can be a lot of biases in their answers. This is why the help of professional scientists in
social psychology is absolutely necessary. In your example, I think that lab-social scientists
should try to further reveal how source effects are related to the complexity of the message,
and check on well controlled experiments the micro theories that they would produce. The
social simulation researchers would then collaborate with them to formalise agents, and then to
simulate them. The fact that some simulations do not produce the global result which actually
took place would certainly not be an argument against such a model. The only requirement is
that the real outcome is a possible outcome of the model (but its probability can be very low).
To summarise, we should behave more as sailors, my friends! Sailors master the complexities of
navigating their ships through various weather and sea conditions, which are often
unpredictable by nature. Yet, their profound understanding of these dynamics allows them to
respond efficiently in keeping their course and arriving at their port of destination. In contrast,
many social scientists, even those interested in dynamics, endeavour to predict the destination
of a voyage given a ship's initial position. Sailors would burst out laughing understanding these
attempts. Rather, as good sailors we should focus on understanding the principles of the
underlying dynamics instead of on the outcomes of these processes. This is not to say that the
outcomes are of no importance! But in order to get a better scientific understanding of getting
these outcomes, we should focus our research at the discovery of 'laws of social dynamics'.
4.3
Dreamer: I agree with you, my dear Experimentalist. And this is why we need to develop new
practises and new methods of simulation. The result of one simulation means nothing. There is
a need to systematically repeat the simulations with the same parameters to evaluate the
randomness of the dynamics. We should also explore the space of parameters in order to
identify their influence on the distribution of the results (because we generally have large
uncertainties on these parameters). This enables to observe regularities and identify the
patterns or "stylised facts" mentioned by Realistic. We probably need tools to improve this
practise, in particular to define the simulation protocols, and to automatically detect patterns.
But, I think that the point is even deeper than this. Stochastic or nonlinear dynamics can give a
variety of outcomes from similar initial conditions as well, without being complex. Complexity
is related to the existence of (at least) two levels of description. The higher level, global
dynamics, is generally almost impossible to directly infer from the lower level, individual
dynamics. True complexity is often even more restrictive: the higher level must have an effect
on the lower level (downward causation). The complexity of social phenomena may lie even
deeper. Some researchers (Gilbert 2002 for instance) consider that downward causation is of a
different nature in social phenomena, because individuals can recognise and react to the global
emergent structures, justifying the definition of a "second-order" emergence. Other researchers
(Dupuy 1992) explain the "second order emergence" by the particular plasticity of human mind,
which can be radically modified by the global social context. The same child, if grown up in an
Amazonian tribe or in the centre of Paris, becomes a totally different person. The downward
causation observed in physics or biology does not have such a strong impact. Agent based
social simulations can bring new and well grounded evidences to clarify these concepts and
problems, because they allow the researchers to observe, as precisely as they want, the
interactions between the lower and the higher levels. The challenge is now to elaborate theories
of these interactions, which would provide, in my view, a major advance in our understanding of
social dynamics, and therefore, of ourselves.
4.4
Realistic: Dreamer! Foolish abstract theories again! By all means, let us formalise the behaviour
and social interactions we observe - that is, after all, what we are doing in writing and running
our simulation models. Formalisation gives precision and it is more likely to make us precisely
wrong than precisely right. Do we impose theories on our observation in the hope that they will
be precisely right? Do we impose number on our descriptions of emotions, opinions, trust,
reputation and norm? Or are we more likely to be both more precise and less wrong by using
the words of natural language in describing these phenomena? Maybe abstract, formal
descriptions - indeed, theories - will emerge from these formalised descriptions. But then
again, maybe not.
……
The night has come, and millions of stars are now witnessing the dispute. It will probably not
end before the sun rises and sets many times. Around, some people are still active whereas
most others are asleep. None imagine the struggle taking place in this villa, about the secrets of
this so strange creation in which they all participate, and are at the same time the products: a
human society.
Notes
1 See “Dialogues concerning two new sciences” - Galileo Galilei.
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